Meanwhile, figures released by BGR note that This direct control will mean better integration of handsets with Windows Phone 8. Apple is the best example of this approach to the mobile industry as they keep the production of both hardware and software in-house.
However, this approach is not without its downsides. These were specifically designed to fit perfectly with Windows 8, crossing the divide between touchscreen devices and laptops.
Yes, the difficulties that faced the Surface are different from those that Windows Phone must contend with, but the example shows that building both hardware and software in concert does not guarantee success. Feature phone still account for around half of all mobiles, and as the market for high-end devices becomes saturated a smart move for manufacturers is to produce cheaper handsets — eg, the imminent coming of the iPhone 5C. This is not to say that the likes of Apple or Samsung are out of the game older iPhone and Galaxy models do very well with first-time owners but there is a huge potential landgrab for Microsoft here.
Mid-range Lumia devices such as the have been great in attracting first-time smartphone users. The handsets are cheap but durable, and Windows Phone 8 has been optimized beautifully to work fluidly even on lower-specced hardware. The design language of colourful contrasts, tiles and fonts looks good even on a low-resolution screen and design flaws that might deter power-users the lack of a decent notification system for example will go unnoticed by those new to smartphones.
Essentially, by giving customers a good Windows experience via their phones, Microsoft are more likely to keep people using their software in other devices. These include the likes Office, Skype, Xbox Live, SkyDrive and Bing: services which are almost-globally familiar, and that can be pushed to more users via mobile. As the world goes mobile, Google and Apple are wresting more and more control away from desktops as their services everything from Google Maps to the App Store become dominant forces.
Buying Nokia not only bought their manufacturing resources but also their mapping services - a key point of entry for mobile users. All of these factors put together - the holistic approach to hardware and software; targeting 'the next billion'; developing the Windows ecosystem - make Microsoft's acquisition of Nokia more than a 'smart move' - really, it was only move that made sense.
The company also announced that it would no longer produce new phones. What had seemed to be a promising venture had feebly wilted. These insights point us to things to consider when preparing for cross-border deals between American and Finnish companies.
Differences in national culture can lead to increased creativity within companies; however, they can also incite bitter conflict. The framework directs dealmakers to better understand how culture can affect their ability to realize synergies, which are the primary rationale for deal making.
The framework elaborates on the following cultural elements: communication, behavior, management, environment, and accounting and finance. Recent Posts See All. Windows Blackberry could have been a very lucrative niche. What next then? Microsoft insists that it will still make smartphones, but will focus on its wider "ecosystem". There will be fewer in-house phones, and the aim will be for them to showcase Windows Phone's capabilities for other manufacturers, much as the Surface does for tablets.
But it is hard to see the likes of Samsung and HTC rushing to make Windows Phone handsets, however great their concerns about their reliance on Android.
And whatever Microsoft says about developing its own mobile ecosystem, it looks as though selling access to its software on other mobile platforms may prove more lucrative. The real tragedy here is for Nokia, Finland and Europe. That at least seemed to promise that the team at what was - only a few years previously - Europe's technology superpower would stay intact, albeit under US ownership.
0コメント